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When individuals commit culturally motivated acts that clash with the law, they 
may ask the courts to consider imperatives that influenced their criminal 
behaviour; namely, invoke a ‘cultural defence’ so as to lessen their 
responsibility. The increasing amount of literature dealing with the issue and 
the defence’s recognition in other jurisdictions raises the question of its 
incorporation in the English courts. This piece seeks to contribute to that by 
illustrating the difficulties of such a development. It seeks to raise the issues of 
reviewing the authenticity of claims and the defence’s potential misuse, and 
most importantly, the difficulty in understanding the ‘foreign’. While the 
proponents of the defence have addressed some of these issues, others 
remained unexamined, lacking theoretical assessment, which is essential for 
incorporating the fluidity and changing nature of cultures.   Such examination 













With the constant influx of immigrants and the subsequent phenomena of 
Diaspora and globalization, diverse cultures come to exist under single legal 
systems. This raises the question of whether defendants’ cultures should be 
considered in criminal trials as mitigating factors. Common law has long been 
reluctant to do so. 1 However, Renteln alongside an increasing number of 
academic advocates for the admission of such a defence, are pushing courts 
to adopt interdisciplinary approaches where the mens rea of the defendant has 
been interfered with by his cultural dictates. This piece argues that the 
recognition of such a defence will bring with it several difficulties for the English 
courts in establishing the authenticity of claims, preventing the defence’s 
misuse and understanding the foreign. These indicate the enormity of the 
reform suggested. 
 
Rationale for Cultural Defence 
Renteln supports the establishment of an official cultural defence in criminal 
trials as long as other human rights are not undermined.2 This is based on the 
assertion that one’s perception and thus acts are fundamentally affected by 
culture. Cultural factors may be categorised with analogous social attributes 
like age, gender and mental state, that are taken into account by the courts, 
and are additionally supported by international law instruments and 
fundamental legal principles like the fairness and equal protection of the law.3 
Accordingly, proponents of cultural defence dispute the fairness of expecting a 
                                                        
1R v Barronet and Allan [1852] 169 Eng. Rep. 633 
2Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘The Use and Abuse of Cultural Defense’ (2005) 20 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society 47, 48 
3ibid 
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newcomer to adjust to and know the law of the state he resides in.4  The 
principle of fairness is also reflected in the risk of excessive punishment. 5   
 
‘’What is the Culture?’’ 
Authenticity 
If such evidence is admitted before the courts, Renteln notes that judges have 
to verify the authenticity of the claims put before them.6 Reliable information will 
thus be needed, most probably provided by the use of expert evidence. It 
seems unlikely that experts such as anthropologists and sociologists will be 
part of the culture themselves. Thus a transformation of cultural facts into forms 
in the court structure will be essential. Such practice remains highly unexplored 
in UK criminal courts while it also raises philosophical and practical issues of 
understanding, as it will be later analysed.7  In addition using members of 
cultural groups as experts themselves bears the risk of misinterpretation of 
cultures, due to societal pressures of defending friends or relatives.8  Torry 
further warns us that such experts risk stepping a ‘minefield’ in an adversarial 
trial, where members of the community or students of the culture can easily 
contest them.9 This relates to the indeterminacy of cultures, resultant from the 
different views within communities themselves, which in turn makes the 
                                                        
4Carolyn Choi, ‘Application of Cultural Defense in Criminal Proceedings’ (1990) 8 Pacific 
Basin Law Journal 80, 86  
5Renteln [n2], 52-53; Siripongs v Calderon (1998) 9th Circ. 133F.3d 732 
6Renteln [n2], 49  
7Gordon R Woodman, ‘The Culture Defence in English Common Law: The Potential for 
Development’ in Marie-Claire Foblets and Alison Dundes Renteln (eds), Multicultural 
Jurisprudence: Comparative Perspectives on Cultural Defense (Hard Publishing, 2009), 32  
8Renteln [n2], 66 
9 William I Torry, ‘Culture and Individual Responsibility: Touchstones of the Culture Defense’ 
(2000) 59 Human Organization 58, 65  
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‘’cultural evidence’’ in the courtroom diverse and opposing.10 The fluidity of 
cultures and the subsequent impossibility of a permanent definition are also 
troublesome.11 Unlike anthropology, current law seems to be based on an 
outmoded worldview of culture that makes no accommodation for cultural 
dissenters.12 The Al-Saidy Case, where two teenage sisters were forced to 
marry Iraqi immigrants (aging 28 and 34 and charged with first-degree sexual 
assault to a child)13 is illustrative. While the incident was deemed definitive of 
Iraqi culture, observers asserted that though such cases were common years 
ago in Iraq, they are currently rare.14  
Misuse 
This risks increasing potential ‘misuses’ of the defence, which is perhaps the 
most obvious difficulty arising for the courts. Indeed, cultural defence has come 
to be invoked in an opportunistic manner to circumvent the criminal justice 
system, either by claiming of belonging to a group 15  or creating peculiar 
generalizations.16 Phillips, in identifying this as one of the four main issues of 
cultural defence, suggests that for courts to avoid such manipulation, a 
transparent test is needed.17 Renteln attempts to resolve that by providing us 
with three questions the courts should take into account. Accordingly, the court 
has to make sure that (i) the litigant is member of the ethnic group, (ii) the group 
                                                        
10Doriane Lambelet Coleman, ‘Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberal’s 
Dilemma’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 1093, 1162  
11Ibid, 1163 
12Madhavi Sunder, ‘Cultural Dissent’ (2001) 54 Stanford Law Review 495, 516  
13Leti Vlopp, ‘Blaming Culture for Bad Behaviour’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law and 
Humanities 89  
14Dallas Morning News, ‘Iraqi Father of Child Brides claims culture as a defence’ (4 
December 1996), 39A 
15United States v Bauer (1996) 9th Circ. 84 F.3d 1549  
16People v Rhines (1982) Cal.Ct.App. 182 Cal. Rptr, 487  
17Anne Phillips, ‘When culture means gender: issues of cultural defence in the English courts’ 
(2003) 66(4) Modern Law Review 510, 513-514  
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has such a tradition and (iii) the tradition influenced the defendant when he 
acted. 18  Failure to meet any limb of this test would render the defence 
inadmissible. She subsequently stresses that had such a test been admitted 
even in the most egregious cases of ’cultural defence’, courts would have been 
protected from manipulations. What is particularly troublesome is the second 
limb of the suggested test, as it is directly linked to the impossibility of defining 
culture, as explained above. The difficulty in establishing the authenticity of 
such claims could directly influence the determination whether a cultural group 
has such a tradition, making Renteln’s test likely to fail in preventing the 
defence’s misuse. 
Understanding the Foreign 
The greatest difficulty that the courts will encounter however seems to be the 
understanding of the ‘’foreign’’, which could lead to the misinterpretation of 
foreign customary practices. Renteln is aware of the issue, as she refers to R v 
Adesanya,19 a case regarding the scarification of a child from his mother as a 
Yoruba tribal custom. Despite the rejection of a cultural defence, the fact that 
the judge referred to a ‘Nigerian’ custom, omitting the diverse tribes within the 
country, highlighted the potential incapability of judges in understanding the 
foreign.20 The most logical solution to the problem is the admission of forensic 
evidence by anthropologists.21 This however, could result in an ‘unprecedented 
flood of complicated cases’.22 To avoid that, Renteln suggests a bigger project, 
which would require the examination of cross-cultural jurisprudence in law 
                                                        
18Renteln [n2], 49-50 
19(17 July 1974)  
20Renteln [n2], 63 
21Torry [n9], 59  
22ibid, 60 
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schools, the inclusion of cultural analysis in bar examinations, and the 
undertaking of cultural and linguistic educational seminars for judges.23  
Prejudice and the Cultural ‘Other’ 
Even if the above are implemented, understanding remains a fundamental 
difficulty for anyone if perceived through Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutics. To 
understand the motive of a defendant, you need to understand his culture.24  
Any form of understanding requires interpretation, and ’[i]interpretation begins 
with fore-conceptions’. 25   What Gadamer claims is that understanding is 
strongly affected by one’s acculturation and tradition. In that way, the 
convictions one brings to an issue, will allow the truth of the situation to assert 
itself. 26Any argument that suggests when a cultural defence is admitted in a 
court, pre-existing beliefs of one’s culture such as gendered violence and 
patriarchy will be able to be omitted seems tenuous. According to Gadamer, 
however, such ‘prejudice’ is legitimate; it only becomes harmful when it is 
‘frozen’.27 In a legal context, cultural prejudices bear that risk to a large extent, 
since current law seems to be premised on an outmoded worldview of culture, 
which can freeze cultural groups in the status quo. 28  As a result, Vlopp 
illustrates how the American society resorts to the selective blaming of culture 
and presumptions that immigrants of colour are passive victims dominated by 
their cultural traditions that come to threaten the alleged ‘cultural-less’ West.29 
It seems highly likely this will be the case in UK courts as well, where frequent 
                                                        
23Renteln [n2], 66 
24Alison Dundes Renteln, The Culture Defense (OUP, 2004), 188 
25Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd edn transl. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G Marshall (London: Sheed and Ward), 267   
26Robert Sokolowksi, ‘Gadamer’s Theory in Hermeneutics’ in Lewis Edwin Hann (ed), The 
Philosophy of Hans- Georg Gadamer (Open Court Publishing Company, 1997), 227  
27ibid, 227 
28Madhavi Sunder, ‘Cultural Dissent’ (2001) 54 Stanford Law Review 495, 503 
29Vlopp [n13], 113  
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reference to ‘English values’ is made. 30   Since cultures, typically of the 
perceived other, are portrayed as primitive and backwards, the power dynamics 
within foreign communities are left unexamined and as a result cultures are 
misinterpreted.  
‘Misinterpreted’ cultures could lead to victims of the crime also becoming 
victims of injustice. This is exemplified in the long attribution of ‘honour killings’ 
to the Muslim diaspora in Europe. For example, in Germany, where a large 
Turkish community exists, prior to the 2004 Bundesgerichtshof landmark 
decision that prevented the consideration of cultural factors to mitigate 
convictions, courts have occasionally downgraded murders to 
manslaughters.31 It has subsequently been asserted that the killings could not 
be attributed to the culture per se. 32  The perpetrators derived from a 
‘marginalized ethnic underclass’ with poor education and social disadvantage, 
which could not be omitted in finding the motives of any offence, while the 
practice was not widely accepted within the Turkish community. In the English 
context, after comparing R v Shabir Hussain 33  with other male violence 
incidents, Phillips concluded that treating such cases as ‘cultural’ is indeed a 
misrepresentation.34 In the aforementioned case the defendant was convicted 
of murdering his sister in law by driving into her. On appeal he introduced a 
guilty plea to manslaughter by provocation on the grounds that the victim 
                                                        
30Woodman [n7], 33  
31Sylvia Maier, ‘Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense in Germany’ in Marie-Claire Foblets 
and Alison Renteln, Multicultural Jurisprudence: Comparative Perspectives on Cultural 
Defense (Hard Publishing, 2009),241 
32Dietrich Oberwittler and Julia Kasselt, Ehrenmorde in Deutschland, Eine Untersuching auf 
der Basis von Prozessakten [Honour Killings in Germany. A Study Based on Prosecution 
Files] (Cologne: Wolters, 2011) 
33[1997] EWCA Crim 2876 
34Phillips [n17], 527 
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defaulted an arranged marriage for her in Pakistan when she was sixteen, the 
victim’s refusal to sign documents so as to enable her husband entry to the UK 
and for having an affair with a married man. His sentence was reduced, as the 
court acknowledged how such behavior could have been highly offensive to 
someone with the defendant’s cultural and religious background. Phillips 
refuses to categorize such cases as cultural as they simply seem to be gender 
difference conventions with a twist of what is perceived as cultural codes.35  
Agreement and morality 
Gadamer also associates understanding with a strong sense of agreement. 
Accordingly, human beings understand each other until they reach an 
agreement.36Let us take an extreme hypothetical scenario. In the Republic of 
Utopia, it is a long established customary practice for parents to commit 
cannibalism on their babies when they are born with blue eyes. It seems 
improbable to imagine an English judge even considering a cultural defence in 
such a case. The judge will not be able to understand the utopian culture, 
because he will fundamentally disagree with the practice. This largely relates 
to the practice’s moral stance. Fisher explains this through Dworkin’s thesis. 
Accordingly, Hercules should understand legal material as presented in its best 
light, meaning in a way that it is morally justified.37 In cases of more grievous 
and controversial offences, such as killings or rape, judges will inescapably 
encounter ‘internal moral’ questions. Such questions will be assessed under 
the judge’s own background and moral values.38 As a result, cultural defence 
                                                        
35ibid, 528 
36Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Polity Press, 1987), 9 
37James C Fisher, ‘The Role of Morality in Culture Defence Cases: Insights from a Dworkinian 
Analysis’ (2013) 1 Birkbeck Law Review 281, 288 
38ibid, 293 
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seems to be successful only in cases where the ‘internal morality’ of the 
committed act, meaning the particular moral substance of the foreign cultural 
practice, reflects the morality of the legal system in which the defendant is tried. 
Interestingly enough, such difficulty could redeem the violation of human rights 
of children and women as victims, one of the main opposing claims to admitting 
the defence in the courts. 
Don’t Forget the Jury! 
It should also be noted that what Renteln suggests does not provide a solution 
of ensuring understanding for the juries. Since in an adversarial system it bears 
an immense role, its proper functioning should not be omitted. In addition to the 
issues of understanding analysed above, the jury frequently faces questions of 
what would the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ do. It is highly unlikely for the 
jury to be made up by members of the defendant’s cultural minority. So how 
can the jury as simple UK civilians apply an objective test when they are on a 
‘different bus’ from the defendant? Sheybanni highlights the importance of such 
an issue by referring to People v Kimura, 39  where a Japanese mother 
committed a mother-child suicide, which, despite illegal, was quite common in 
Japan.40 The court, instead of considering Japanese culture, opted to base its 
judgment on lack of sanity and emotional illness, and reduced her sentence 
from murder to manslaughter. If the jury were to consider her cultural 
background, she would most likely be convicted of first-degree murder,41 simply 
because what she did is unreasonable in the eyes of an American jury. 
Contrastingly, in the eyes of a Japanese jury this would be completely 
                                                        
39(1985) Los Angeles Super. Ct. No. A-091133   
40Malek-Mithra Sheybani, ‘Cultural Defense: One Person’s Culture is Another’s Crime’ 9 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 751  
41ibid, 762-763 
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understood, and in fact would be considered a honourable way of dying.42 In 
the light of such scenarios, Renteln suggests the creation of juries made up by 
members of the defendant’s minority group, though she herself admitted that 
such a huge reform is unlikely to be accommodated by any legal system,43 as 
it might be considered an illegitimate form of affirmative action. People v 
Hernadez 44  illustrates how that can be the case, as it was held that the 
exclusion of Spanish-speaking jurors did not constitute a violation of equal 
protection, since the nexus between language and ethnicity (Spanish and 
Latinos) was weak. 
Impossibility of Translation 
It should also be noted that any attempt to understand the foreign would 
inevitably include the translation of foreign texts, either legal or not. This will 
raise issues either where the judges are the translators themselves or the 
readers of translated work. Since the reason of examination of foreign material 
is specifically the understanding of a culture, an ethical approach to translation 
should be adopted; namely, the translator should try to move the reader 
towards the writer, leaving the latter intact.45Yet, the feasibility of such an 
approach can be challenged in two ways. Firstly, access to foreign law can 
never be impartial. Gadamer’s theory on ‘prejudice’ extends to textual 
interpretation. Secondly, it can be challenged through Jacques Derrida’s 
Monolinguism where he equated ethics with hospitality. Pure hospitality can 
never be achieved, as rules will be imposed on the ‘foreigner’ simply because 
                                                        
42ibid, 767 
43Renteln [n24], 209   
44(1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1374 
45Friedrich Schleiermarcher, ‘On the Different Methods of Translating’ in Rainer Schulte and 
John Biguenet (eds), Theories of Translation, transl. by Waltraud Bartsch (University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 42 
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his ontology and actions are unknown.46 Similarly, ethical translation is limited 
by the rules of the target language. Accessibility to the culture deriving from the 
text is thus limited. Nonetheless, understanding culture is essential to the 
‘defence’. Therefore the ‘’impossible should be made possible’’, 47 by adopting 
an ‘alienating’ strategy of translation which would highlight the particularities of 
the original text, giving thus the impression that the text read is foreign. Yet it 
should be remembered that this would turn the act of ‘’translation’’ to one of 
‘’transformation’’, as it will inevitably involve an interpretative act. 
 
Conclusion 
Evidently, admitting such a ‘defence’ in the UK courts raises several issues. 
Establishing the authenticity of claims is hindered by culture’s indeterminacy 
resultant from diverse views within it and its fluid nature, which current law fails 
to perceive. This in turn prevents courts from detecting cases in which ‘culture’ 
is notoriously invoked in order to circumvent the criminal justice system. 
Although proponents of the defence present several reforms that mainly include 
the adoption of interdisciplinary approaches, this does not seem to be enough 
so as to thwart current laws’ incapacity to understand culture. Understanding 
the ‘foreign’ is by itself a demanding exercise.  In the case of cultural defence it 
becomes even harder due to the westernized conceptions of the ‘other’ and the 
misconceptions about the feasibility of global application of western morality 
and human rights. Translation also stands as a further barrier in properly 
understanding the ‘foreign’, as capturing the exact meaning of a text and its 
                                                        
46Herman Rapaport, Later Derrida: Reading Recent Work (Routledge, 2003), 29 
47Simone Glanert, ‘Translation matters’ in Simone Glanert (ed), Comparative Law- Engaging 
Translation (Routledge, 2014), 7  
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enhanced cultural factors seems like an impossible task for either the reader of 
translated work or the translator himself. What Renteln suggests is a good 
starting point. Yet, in order to prevent the defence’s misuse, the difficulty of 
properly understanding the cultural practice behind an offence should not be 
underestimated. Despite complete understanding being theoretically 
unfeasible, this era of globalization leaves the courts with no choice but to 
consider such factors. Multiculturalism is now a reality; we are entering into a 
new world order. Accordingly, what will be needed, sooner or later, is a new law 
order, whereby the criminal legal system, in a revolutionary coordinated effort, 
that some might view as futile, will seek to capture the ‘foreign’- each time 
focusing on obtaining a deeper understanding, yet ultimately knowing that its 
mission will fail.  
 
 
 
 
 
